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Introduction
Brazil has the fifth largest territorial area and one of largest world economies with some of its most valuable ecosystems. It also boasts the fourth largest investment fund market with 5.5 percent of global mutual fund net assets, after the USA, Luxembourg, and Australia (48.9, 8.9, and 5.7 percent, respectively) at the end of September 2012 (European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), 2012). Even though there are studies that include USA, European, and Australian socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, Brazilian SRI funds have not been sampled in previous international research. This paper fills this gap.
SRI funds invest in a smaller set of companies relative to other stock funds. The additional stock selection constraints may not lead to the same return for a certain level of risk than in less constrained portfolios. In contrast, there is evidence that even simple constraints may lead to better out-of-sample performing portfolios because historical asset return averages, variances and correlations are not good MV optimization inputs (Behr et al., 2013) . Thus, it is possible that the additional SRI constraints may not affect, or maybe even improve, risk-adjusted performance.
This paper offers a risk-adjusted performance analysis of 11 Brazilian SRI funds relative to local index funds. It uses portfolios of funds and matched pairs of funds. The period examined begins with the introduction of each fund, usually after 2005, and ends in December of 2010.
The findings suggest that SRI funds performed as well as portfolios representing the broad market on a risk-adjusted basis. SRI funds behaved similarly to market benchmarks both before and during the global financial crisis. The evidence also suggests that independent investment houses are not interested in SRI funds because only large financial conglomerates managed the still active SRI funds in a market with 474 asset managers in June 2013, with the vast majority independent. The large financial conglomerates, on the other hand, may see these funds as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) image strategy. This paper proceeds with a literature review, followed by the presentation of the sample and methodology, the analysis of the results, and concluding remarks.
Literature review
The way investors screen SRI firms may be critical. Statman and Glushkov (2009) recommend that investors use a best-in-class approach. Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) favored specialized managers in the USA. Lee et al. (2010) examined 61 US funds between 1989 and 2006 and found a return decline of 70 basis points per year for each additional screening filter. They concluded that an increase in the intensity of screening does not impact non-systematic risk but reduces total risk. They also suggested that asset managers needed to be careful regarding screening intensity to address the trade-off between the economic attractiveness of funds and their CSR character. Renneboog et al. (2008a) offer a review of the SRI investment literature and conclude that SRIs may, not unequivocally, underperform. Schröder (2004) found no significant differences in the returns of SRI funds in Germany, Switzerland, and the USA between 1990 and 2002. Kreander et al. (2005) used a matched sample of 40 SRI and conventional stock funds from seven European countries between 1996 and 1998 and found no significant performance difference between them. Renneboog et al. (2008b) investigated 440 SRI funds in 17 countries from Asia, Europe, North America, and Oceania between 1991 and 2003 and found an inferior performance of SRI funds. Cortez et al. (2012) investigated the performance of 46 SRI funds from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA between 1996 and 2008 and found that performance, depending on the country, is either inferior or does not differ from benchmarks.
The US market is by far the largest mutual fund market in the world. Statman and Glushkov (2000) analyzed 31 US SRI funds between 1990 and 1998 and concluded that they underperformed relative to the S&P500 index. Bello (2005) compared 42 US SRI funds with a liquidity-matched sample of 84 conventional stock funds between 1994 and 2001 and found mixed results. Benson et al. (2006) concluded that the performance of 185 SRI funds did not differ from conventional stock funds. Statman and Glushkov (2009) arrive at similar conclusions. Shank et al. (2005) , on the other hand, compared ten-stock portfolios of socially responsible firms to non-adherent companies between 1993 and 2003 and found that socially responsible portfolios offered significant a's in long rather than in short holding periods. Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) Martins and Lemme (2012) claim that Brazilian SRI funds tend to index, at least informally, following the ISE, and employ less sophisticated asset selection criteria when compared to their international counterparts.
Methodology
Brazilian stock funds represented 8.4 percent (about US$88 billion) of the over US$1 trillion in net assets under management (AUM) in the local mutual fund industry, which is dominated by fixed income funds (46.3 percent of AUM) and multi-strategy funds (20.1 percent of AUM) (Associac¸ão Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais (Anbima), 2013). Brazilian multi-strategy mutual funds may invest up to 49 percent of their assets in stocks and some are akin to US hedge funds. The remaining types of funds, such as retirement accounts, structured debt and equity financing, currency, and commodity funds, may contain some stock.
We used the Quantum Axis s mutual fund database that includes all Brazilian mutual funds and obtains its raw data from the Brazilian Association of the Financial and Capital Market Entities (Associac¸ão Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais, (Anbima) ) to obtain daily and monthly local currency fund returns net of management fees and before taxation.
We identified 31 funds under the "stock sustainability/governance" category. We excluded those that claimed to target "corporate governance" and remained with 20 SRI funds. Ten of them are funds of funds that invest in a master SRI fund, consisting of alternate marketable versions of such fund. We excluded the funds of funds and retained the other ten as our sample. This is the same number of funds identified in an International Finance Corporation (2009) study.
The ten SRI funds were active at the end of the sampled period so there could be a survivorship bias problem. We searched the discontinued fund portion of the database with the same criteria and included one additional SRI fund in our sample, which totaled 11 SRI funds. Even though the first SRI fund introduced in Brazil, which is included in the sample, dates back to 2001, most SRI funds were introduced after the creation of the ISE in December 2005. In total, five of them declare that they are ISE indexed but others may index informally, as Martins and Lemme (2012) pointed out. The funds managed by Itaú and Santander were launched before the introduction of the ISE and may have developed better SRI skills.
Asset managers associated with large Brazilian and foreign financial conglomerates manage most funds, except the Janus and Votorantim funds. Janus is a family office 434 IJMF 10,4
and Votorantim is a medium-sized financial institution that focusses on consumer credit and does not have a network of bank branches. The Legg Mason funds are mainly distributed through Citibank. The larger Brazilian financial conglomerates, Banco do Brasil, Bradesco, Caixa, Itaú, HSBC, Safra, Santander, and Unibanco, manage all the others and distribute them through their large chain of commercial bank branches. More details about the funds are available upon request.
There were 474 asset management houses in Brazil with about US$1 trillion AUM on-shore in June 2013 (Anbima, 2013) . Most of them are independent asset managers who are not associated with the large financial conglomerates. There are no independent asset managers among the surviving funds in the sample, suggesting that these funds are part of a CSR image strategy of the large financial conglomerates because it is unlikely that they are the only ones capable of dominating an SRI investment strategy.
Brazil has no separate regulations for hedge and mutual funds. All funds are treated under the same framework regarding disclosure and must mark-to-market daily. Brazilian "hedge funds" are mutual funds with some characteristics of US hedge funds. They charge a performance fee, target qualified investors, require higher minimum investments, use leverage and short selling, and have a multi-strategy approach (Leal and Mendes, 2010) . Multi-strategy funds cannot have more than 49 percent of their AUM in stocks or else they would be classified as stock funds, which are subject to different taxation rules. Therefore, our selection criteria did not include multi-strategy funds. We are also confident that we did not include any leveraged or long-short funds in our sample of SRI funds. Thus, the SRI mutual funds in the sample are similar to long-only mutual funds elsewhere.
The Ibovespa index is the most widely followed Brazilian market index. It is trading volume weighted and contains a variable number of stocks that exceed a minimum liquidity threshold. It included 71 stocks in August of 2013. The Ibovespa represents more than 90 percent of the Brazilian market capitalization. The IBrX (I´ndice Brasil ) index consists of 100 stocks, is market value weighted, and its stocks are selected according to their market liquidity and capitalization. Both indices are rebalanced every four months. The IBrX-50 index is a version of the IBrX with 50 stocks. Many IBrX-50 indexed funds are open-end funds that exclusively buy shares of the PIBB (Papeis I´ndice Brasil Bovespa) closed-end fund, which was the first Brazilian exchange-traded fund and is indexed to the IBrX-50.
We compared the SRI funds to index funds in the analysis because they are long-only. Moreover, we are interested in the performance of SRI funds relative to the overall market, considering investment vehicles actually available to investors, as opposed to index return series, and these funds represent a low-cost alternative to retail investors, which are the predominant target of SRI funds managed by large financial conglomerates. Our index fund sample contains 36 funds, 13 indexed to the Ibovespa and 23 to the IBrX or IBrX-50 indices.
Our initial analysis compared an equally weighed portfolio of SRI funds with an equally weighted portfolio of Ibovespa or IBrX indexed funds. We used a 60-month period from January 2006 through December 2010 in this analysis because this is the period when most SRI funds were introduced. The portfolios were equally weighted but the number of funds they contain varies in time, depending on the introduction or discontinuation of individual funds. The 1/n weight changed as the total number of funds available (n) changed.
We performed a matched-pair analysis, beginning each paired return series when both SRI and an index fund returns, managed by the same asset manager, were
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Socially responsible stock funds in Brazil available. In addition to Ibovespa indexed funds, we also used IBrX or IBrX-50 indexed funds when an asset manager offered then, but we show only the results for the pair with the longer time series. We did not find index funds managed by Janos, Legg Mason, and Votorantim and, thus, did not match their SRI funds. We used Jensen's a (a i ) and the Sharpe ratio (SR) as risk-adjusted performance measures. We computed fund returns (R i,t ) as P i,t /P i,tÀ1 -1, with P as the net asset value of the fund in period t and employed Equation 1 to obtain a i , where R i,t is the rate of return of SRI fund i in period t, R ft the risk-free rate proxy, R b,t the return of the benchmark fund, and b i the slope and e i,t the error term of the regression:
The Interbank Certificate of Deposit rate (CDI, Certificado de Dep osito Interfinanceiro) is a one-day average report rate and is the most commonly used investment benchmark in Brazil. It is quite common that mutual funds present their performance as a percentage of the CDI rate. The CDI rate behavior and levels are very similar to those of the short-term treasury rate. Hence, we used the CDI rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate. Equation 2 shows the historical SR, in which the numerator is the difference between the averages of R i,t and R ft and s i,t is the standard deviation of the historical excess returns in the numerator. Sharpe (1994) shows that the historical SR times the square root of the number of observations used to compute it is equivalent to a t-statistics for the significance of the differential return, the numerator of the ratio. Thus, at the 5 percent level, the critical SR on a two-tailed test for a sample of 60 monthly returns would be71.96 Â 60 0.5 ¼ 70.25:
Results Table I presents descriptive statistics for the equally weighted portfolios of funds from January 2006 through December 2010. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test did not reject the normality hypothesis for any series of monthly returns. The means and standard deviations of the SRI funds portfolios are not significantly different from those of the index funds portfolios. The median return of the portfolio of SRI funds is lower than its mean and the medians of the portfolios of index funds. Table I also shows that the Jensen's a's and the SRs for the SRI funds are not significantly different from zero. These initial results suggest that the performance and volatility of SRI funds do not differ from those of the market, represented by the portfolios of index funds. Naturally, this is not surprising because we are comparing portfolios of funds that are certainly well diversified at the domestic level. Table II presents the matched-pair analysis. We matched the SRI funds with Ibovespa and IBrX indexed funds managed by the same asset manager. The length of the time series varies according to the simultaneous availability of returns of the paired funds. The series begin in the first full month of returns of the SRI fund in all but two cases that begin in the first full month of returns of the paired index fund. There are no significant results in the table. All mean returns of SRI funds are not significantly different from those of the paired index fund. Variances (and thus standard deviations) are not significantly different between SRI and matched index funds. There are no significant Jensen's a's and SRs. The results in Table II support those in Table I and   436 IJMF 10, 4 suggest that the risk-adjusted performance of Brazilian SRI funds is similar to that of local index funds and, by extension, to the overall market. The a's suggest that SRI fund managers display no special skills relative to index funds offered by the same asset management house. However, it is interesting to point out that the two funds that precede the creation of the ISE and that possibly have more experienced management teams (Itaú and Santander) present the two highest SRs.
We repeated the analysis for the portfolios of funds in Table II Table III and are consistent with the above-mentioned results. Even though the performance of the portfolios of funds was worse in the second sub-period, as expected, there are no significant differences between the portfolios within periods. There are no significant a's and SRs as well. The portfolio of SRI funds behaved similarly to the index funds portfolios both before and during the global financial crisis.
We repeated the analysis in Table I with daily returns, instead of monthly returns. The results remained qualitatively the same. We do not report them here but they are available upon request. Finally, the lack of significant a's did not demand the use of additional factors in Equation 1. Furthermore, Castro and Minardi (2009) employed the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to a large sample of Brazilian active and indexed stock mutual funds and found that the vast majority of indexed funds, unsurprisingly, and 
Concluding remarks
We analyzed 11 SRI funds, including one discontinued fund, a very small number in a universe of 13,417 funds in Brazil in June 2013, in which stock funds represented only 8.4 percent of the approximately US$1 trillion in net AUM (Anbima, 2013) . We formed portfolios of funds to compare them with portfolios of index funds in the January 2006 through December 2010 period (60 months) and in two 30-month sub-periods. We also performed a matched-pair analysis comparing SRI funds with index funds managed by the same asset manager. There was no significance for the (27) 0.0104 0.0758 0.0237 -Notes: All series are monthly returns ending in December of 2010. "SD" is the standard deviation of monthly returns. Jensen's a was computed relative to the corresponding index fund. There is no significance at the 5 or 10 percent levels for any of the mean monthly return differences between an SRI fund and an index fund, in the case of the mean return, from zero, in the case of the Sharpe ratios and Jensen's a's, and for the variance ratios Brazil had 474 asset managers in June 2013. The vast majority of them are not associated with the large financial conglomerates that dominate the commercial banking industry and manage most of the AUM. Nevertheless, managers associated with the large financial conglomerates managed all SRI funds in our sample, except for a discontinued one, and no independent manager introduced an SRI fund in the period. It is possible that SRI funds may simply represent a CSR image strategy. At least five of the ten active SRI funds are indexed to a Brazilian sustainability stock index, suggesting, as well, that asset managers may not be interested in allocating specialized talent to these funds, consistent with the CSR image story.
Brazilian SRI funds are a very small niche in the stock mutual fund universe of the country. Stock funds, in turn, are also a relatively small niche of the mutual fund industry, dominated by fixed income and multi-strategy funds. Thus, our sample represented the universe of master SRI funds in Brazil, to the best of our knowledge, until December 2010, but the small number of funds is a limitation. The lack of interest in SRI on the part of the more sophisticated independent asset managers reveals that the majority of players in the business do not consider this strategy to be important enough to deserve an exclusive vehicle. On the other hand, one cannot say that independent asset managers do not include SRI screening in their stock selection criteria. The use of SRI screening by the most prominent independent asset managers is a potential topic for future research.
